Author Olivier Scherlofsky, at the Key Note of the Austria Connect USA 2024 in Chicago. Presenting our findings to Austrian industry leaders investing in and/or trading with the U.S.
[Note: Our findings are independent products, not standing for or originating from other private or government parties, such as U.S. or Austrian national agencies of any sort.]
Summary of Our "Most Likely" Scenario We Had Published in 2023 - and How It Is Unfolding Today
Pictures above, from our 2023 published scenario white book THE BIG RESHUFFLE,
show our back-then "most likely" prediction/scenario for the later 2020s and beyond.
Our "Most Likely" Scenario Since Years:
The U.S. Turning the Ship of the World System to Prevent an Eurasian Hegemon China
Back in 2023 we published what we saw (and still see) as the most likely scenario for the 2020s and 2030s – independent of who is U.S. President: The unfolding of a long, slow, but determined American grand strategic turn to counter China. Driven by a U.S. understanding that otherwise rising China would eventually become the Eurasian hegemon: dominating ever weaker nations (their markets, resources, information/ideology, and politics), from a deindustrializing Europe to Asia, Russia, and Africa.
One of the underlying trends American strategists are thereby alarmed about is the continuing shift in economic weight and wealth (which eventually translates into military and political power, as well as already now into soft power in the sense of attractiveness and influence with others). A mega trend that has been driven by an authoritarian China using its capital strategically, "acquiring" (through different ways) Western technology, and eventually pushing out (or taking over) Western companies; in order to dominate ever more critical markets and supply chains. At the same time, jobs and corporate profits are moved from the West to China, and with it tax revenues necessary to sustain systems and stability on the long run. All while the West is financially threatened by growing debt at a time of growing costs for defense, security, and social efforts (demographics, poor mass migration,...). [Diagrams below based on IWF database.]
It gets worse when not merely looking at the aggregate economic picture (GDP) but at specific strategic sectors. For example, China has developed an iron grip over Green Energy and EV car supply chains. (See below U.S. statistics.) It is not much better in other strategic sectors, such as critical supply for the defense industry. [Diagrams based on informed U.S. datasets, see footnotes.]
Whereby one should not take too much comfort in such mutual dependence or any “signals of relief” like agreements. It can be shown that most likely any conciliatory moments, words, or deals between the U.S. and China are, for both sides, primarily about buying time: Washington and Beijing are indeed still in a phase of mutual dependence in key areas. But both work on reducing their mutual dependence. Once this mutual dependence has been reduced sufficiently will the gloves come off. To roughly track this timing, one should watch both shifts in China’s behavior and the progress of U.S. efforts to secure critical raw‑material supplies now dominated by China. And indeed, the related U.S. efforts are beginning to succeed, as the DFC, the Pax Silica coalition, and other programs start to prove. (See further below about DFC and supply chain strategies the U.S. is now initiating.)
Behind this China threat assessment, America's strategists started to point at something deeper, more systemic. In the words of Marco Rubio:
“The post-war global order is not just obsolete,
it is now a weapon being used against us.
[…] if we don't change course,
we are going to live in a world
where much of what matters to us on a daily basis, from our security to our health,
will be dependent on whether the Chinese allow us to have it or not.
That's an unacceptable outcome.”
Marco Rubio, U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor,
publicly during his confirmation hearing in early 2025
Rubio being a prominent example of what we call "America's Strategist Class". His strategic weight in Washington today rivals Henry Kissinger at the height of his influence: Thanks to Trump, Rubio has become the only American in history next to Kissinger to have combined the two most powerful foreign‑policy offices, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, in one person.
Translating Scenario Frameworks Into a Client's Advantage
Identifying this threat picture and its consequences creates immense value. By linking our geopolitics-driven models to the work of America’s Strategist Class and comparing both with actual action, HFASA and its partner network successfully prepare their clients, such as one of the world's largest financial institutions, for this systemic change unfolding.
However, this change and how current events relate to it is still hard to grasp, for too many (smart) observers. Rather, when it comes to geopolitics, we experience that particularly most European managers tend to get distracted by daily news, short-term events, or a U.S. President Trump who since the 1980s has mastered the art of playing with audiences and counterparties, deliberately distracting and/or creating unpredictability (“I like being unpredictable. It keeps them off balance.” Trump, 2015, on how he would drive Foreign Policy). Similarly, the strategists Trump has put in charge of American grand strategy development separate between public talk, mid- to long-term plans, and actions. As one of these responsible strategists, Elbridge Colby, stated it recently
"Talk and action are different.
So our policy the Secretary has laid out is strong and clear, but quiet. So measure what the United States and the United States Department of War is doing by actions and not what we call peacocking, which I think is really different from the last administration [...]"
Elbridge Colby, U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy,
in Interesting Times with Ross Douthat (New York Times), July 23rd 2026
Colby being indeed another prime example of the relevance of America’s Strategist Class. Like during his first presidency, Trump again tasked Colby, the grandson of legendary CIA Director William E. Colby, with crafting U.S. strategy. In our 2023 publication we urged our clients to read his published doctrinal recommendations – when he was heading a small think tank. Today Elbridge Colby, a Harvard-educated Metternich expert promoting "flexible Realism" instead of "value foreign policy", serves as Under Secretary for Policy, in the U.S. Department of War. Shaping the development and execution of the very grand strategic shift we currently see unfolding. Contrary to the EU-wide promoted view that Trump acts without strategy or selects unqualified appointees, whenever critical the opposite tends to be the case.
America's Grand Strategic Shift to Counter China:
Reestablishing U.S. Dominance Over Critical Supply Chains, Technology, Commerce, and Energy Flows
Guided by these strategists, the U.S. is executing its shift to (re)establish American/Western dominance over critical supply chains, technology, commerce, and energy flows. From this perspective Washington's actions-not-talk, such as
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blocking critical Chinese imports (de facto no more EV cars into the U.S.),
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build-up of control and/or military presence along maritime bottlenecks (Panama, Hormuz, Red Sea, Greenland, plus increased U.S. military activity next to the straits of Gibraltar and Malacca),
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disrupting China's cheap oil sources (Venezuela, Iran),
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pushing Europe to "de-risk from China" and rearm seriously so the U.S. can deploy more force elsewhere,
form a cohesive pattern, following a strategic logic.
In this fateful structural struggle U.S. vs China, everything else tends to become a sideshow or proxy conflict. As a result, globalization defined by WTO rules is being actively reshuffled into something new. And like in earlier periods, allies and third countries that align themselves with the emerging American system are most likely to thrive and prosper by gaining privileged access to markets, capital, technology, energy, and security. Those that actively resist it face a greater risk of strategic isolation, deepening dependence on China, or disorderly economic and geopolitical decline.
Over the longer term, our models therefore expect a renewed West under U.S. leadership eventually to prevail in this new Cold War – although only after a confusing, difficult, and disruptive period of transition and struggle.
Whereby regarding this grand strategic American adjustment to counter China and win Cold War 2.0, a continuity exists between the presidencies Trump I, Biden, and Trump II.
Nevertheless, President Trump is a shaping factor in this long game: While even Biden continued Trump's anti-WTO and anti-China course, the 2017-to-2024 developments might be seen as mere preparations compared to what we witness now under the Trump II presidency. A presidency that the U.S. Supreme Court just made stronger than any other U.S. presidency in decades ("Historic Court Ruling Expands Presidential Power" as Bloomberg put it, June 29th 2026); being the result of deliberate and well calculated strategies developed and executed by the Trump coalition. Causing even declared Trump critics among America's established political scientists to observe about the Trump II presidency that "there are some very very very clever people who are working on some of these pieces, the amount of of legal work that is backing this up, the kind of ingenuity of using existing laws [...]" (Don Kettl and Bill Kristol in: Conversations with Bill Kristol, July 24th 2025).
And so in 2029 there will be no "back-to-before-Trump", no matter who succeeds him. By 2029 the international system will have changed too substantially for a simple reversal. And the American Strategist Class will still be in the room working on winning Cold War 2.0, even should a President who is sporting a different language and methods follow Trump.
At the same time, the narrative distributed via many EU outlets that the U.S. would abandon Europe is not only not true, but often an attempt to hide the actual purpose of America's new Europe Strategy: America's goal is to help Europe returning to a focus on wealth, security, power, freedom, and Western-civilizational confidence. Since only a Europe that shifts back to strength and capacity, instead of focusing on "saving-the-world values", can help the U.S. Otherwise America's Western block would be too weak to win the struggle against the rising Chinese empire. As can be read in America's official top-level strategy document National Security Strategy, in its chapter about America's Europe Strategy:
"C. Promoting European Greatness
American officials have become used to thinking about European problems in
terms of insufficient military spending and economic stagnation. There is truth to
this, but Europe’s real problems are even deeper.
[...]
Yet Europe remains strategically and culturally vital to the United States.
Transatlantic trade remains one of the pillars of the global economy and of
American prosperity. European sectors from manufacturing to technology to
energy remain among the world’s most robust. Europe is home to cutting-edge
scientific research and world-leading cultural institutions. Not only can we not
afford to write Europe off—doing so would be self-defeating for what this strategy
aims to achieve.
[...]
Our goal should be to help Europe correct its current trajectory. We will need a
strong Europe to help us successfully compete, and to work in concert with us to
prevent any adversary from dominating Europe.
[...]"
Selected focus and highlights by the author;
for full document see the White House's version of the
U.S. National Security Strategy.
For those outside the U.S. the difficulty being to see the forest despite the many trees of daily news and angry opinions. Which is where our big picture-oriented models help to shift the focus on the actions and moves that actually shape the world's future...
The Substantive American Moves
that - Unlike Daily Chatter - Shape Tomorrow's World
With the help of our Realism-driven intelligence models, we avoid the "erratic daily trees" and instead focus on grasping the forest: The structural realities; the long-cycles of U.S. grand strategy (times of global open commerce vs. times of strategic competition); and America's reality-shaping moves like the following that fit into the grand strategic framework:
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While Europe's industrial core gets gradually replaced by China's industry, not least thanks to China's strategic campaigns of industrial and ideological nature (e.g. China supporting ideas of "industrial and energy restraint" or even "de-growth" elsewhere via UN/IGOs and NGOs, while aggressively pushing its own industry and exports outwards), the U.S. has successfully started to halt Chinese imports where they hurt strategically. (E.g. Chinese EV car exports, that have began to oust the leading German and Japanese car brands, have been kept out of the U.S. By America applying active and aggressive internal measures - while also forcing Mexico and Canada to stop "forwarding" Chinese cars and similarly strategic products into the U.S. as "Canadian" or "Mexican" products.)
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Based on a recognizable global U.S. naval campaign, the major maritime chokepoints in the world - Gibraltar, Malacca, Hormuz, the Red Sea, Panama, and the Greenland passages (incl. its Arctic lane) - are effectively being drawn under American power. Other, less known, chokepoints add to the list. Supertankers reroute to American ports. Further improving America's new Energy Dominance approach. At a time when (affordable) energy decides whether nations can join the energy-hungry AI-revolution. A new industrial revolution that is fundamentally restructuring power and wealth (industrial, informational/cultural, and military power and wealth).
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The U.S. successfully has started to drive both China and Russia out of the two Americas, while also directly or indirectly helping end ever more "red governments" there. Directly in places like Venezuela. Indirectly in many others. As a result, since decades the Americas haven't been so conservative and pro-Western as they are now...
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The U.S. seizing oil vessels (increasingly those on their way to China), in different oceans. (Legally-technically by sanctioning cargo, vessels, and/or owners/operators, then labeling it as sanctions enforcement; usually executed by the U.S. Navy as "maritime interdiction" actions, at the request of the U.S. DOJ.)
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The U.S. has proposed one of the biggest and most expensive naval force shipbuilding programs in history. While such long-term programs most of the time change and evolve over time, for several reasons we consider it unlikely that over the years to come such projects would not be continued. The world is returning to an age of naval force and protection, and the U.S. will defend its naval dominance and thus the potential to protect or disrupt the follow of most commerce. The only nation that could challenge this unique advantage in the years to come is China. Accordingly, the U.S. is not sitting back and watching that happen...
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China's industrial rise is based on cheap energy from the Strait of Hormuz (until recently dominated by the Iranian navy), Venezuela, and Russia. That substantial variable for China's future industrial growth is step by step getting reshaped by America's grand strategic counter operations:
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Now China's most critical cheap energy sources, Venezuela and Iran, got reset in their capabilities and relations; while at the same time the U.S. started to break the Axis China-Russia-Iran-Venezuela-Cuba by proving that neither Russia nor China will/can help "their allies" in meaningful ways:
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Venezuelan oil now (Iranian oil soon) being under U.S. contracts or influence instead of feeding China's industrial power for lowest non-market prices, while
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Iran has lost its naval capabilities to dominate the strait of Hormuz.
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Before the attacks on Iran by the U.S. it was clear to naval strategists, that any realistic outcome of such a U.S.-Iran war would undermine China's critical supply, while helping the U.S. in the long game vs. China: 80% of the oil and gas that goes through the strait of Hormuz is going to Asia. Thus:
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Scenario A, "Hormuz stays chaotic": Either the strait of Hormuz stays chaotic and clogged, then China lacks its supply from there while U.S. allies in Asia can buy energy from the U.S. and others. At the same time, should "the wrong" tankers be able to leave the strait, the U.S. Navy, having shaped the region and being prepared, can board tankers safely outside such a chaotic Hormuz. From a purely economic perspective The Wall Street Journal accentuated this aspect very well, just a few weeks after the U.S.-Iran war had started, by headlining: “The Iran War Is Making the American Economy More Dominant Than Ever.”
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Scenario B, "Hormuz/Iran becoming influenced by the U.S. and its returning oil corporations": In this scenario, the strait ends up U.S. influenced (e.g. controlled by an Iran that is making money with U.S. businesses, as long as it sticks to a U.S. Deal).
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At the same time, in any scenario, thanks to the U.S. having shaped the strait, it can easily and quickly blockade the strait at will, in the future.
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We see mid- to long-term oriented efforts to get Russia, the third of China's three cheap energy sources, eventually away from its recent total dependency on China. Thus, whether Russia will continue to be an ever cheaper fuel station for China, has to be seen - good reasons exist why this might change too, eventually. (If Russia wants to be relevant in the world as well as prosper instead of falling back, becoming a resource colony of a rising Eurasian hegemon China is not the way to go - and ever more Russians become aware of that threat to its future. America has more to offer, and Europe too will agree to a solution based on an eventual settlement in Ukraine.)
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The U.S. using tariffs and threats of tariffs, as well as the deliberately created uncertainty, to get "China de-risking supply chains" concessions otherwise impossible - and in doing so forcing critical countries slowly away from China.
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America shifted its "soft power tool" for influence in developing nations from "USAID" (which had turned into an NGO financing machine) to a strategic resources and business approach under the new DFC (U.S. International Development Finance Corporation), now reauthorized through December 2031 under the bipartisan DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act of 2025, with a current investment cap above USD 200 billion.
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We see a quiet tightening of American financial leverage over "middle powers" (Swap Diplomacy: affecting questions such as who gets U.S. Dollar swap lines to stay internationally solvent and avoid local currency debasements,...).
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To defend the global status of the American financial system, and to improve its strategic flexibility and weaponization capability, within the U.S. we see that the U.S. Treasury is turning from a de facto "subordinate" of the "all dominant" Fed into the actual power center behind the U.S. Dollar system. All while ensuring that the growing digitalization and tokenization of currencies, financial markets, and blockchain assets stay dominated by U.S. actors (USD Stablecoins requiring issuers to purchase and hold USD, Bitcoin strategic reserve,...).
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The little recognized Pax Silica coalition is organizing the AI-era supply-chain stack along nations close to the U.S. and capable to establish supply chain chokepoints.
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Whenever relevant, WTO and UN get ignored by pointing at "national security".
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The sphere of "global values" IGOs/NGOs (that gained ever more resources and influence over the last 20-plus years) is getting stripped of power and money, due to the U.S. slashing funds and rearranging relations and expectations. (Outside the EU, those few IGOs and NGOs that remain being supported by governments, particularly the U.S., have little to do with the "global morality agendas" sported recently.)
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NATO and European allies (the first time in decades being frightened to be left alone if not ramping up seriously) rearming in dimensions and speeds considered "impossible". And in doing so providing the U.S. the freedom to focus on its new hotspots. While the EU is slowly adapting to America`s strategy of step by step decreasing ties to China (EU implementing export controls, de-risking, import controls, anti-circumvention rules in transatlantic trade agreements,...).
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As well as many other such actually substantial shaping of the vital realities nations have to live with...
Whereas this adapted American grand strategy, one rooted in core principles of geopolitical power, does not bet on “controlling all flows.” Global control was the idea behind the strategic program launched in the 1990s, which was centered on the promotion of idealistic “values to change the whole world.” In the end, it failed: unlike during the Cold War prior to this program, the West did not become stronger and more attractive; instead, after success in the 1990s, from the 2000s on non-Western powers and authoritarian models rose despite the defeat of the USSR (a victory that, it seems, was not used well). But global control is neither possible nor necessary. What is necessary – and what the U.S. is achieving in these months and years – is to become the only force in the world that can guarantee secure and affordable global flows for itself and its allies (those being loyal), while retaining the ability to disrupt or deny the flows on which adversaries depend.
What makes this hard to read from the Europe of today is that strategists in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow do not think in the "global values" Brussels talks about. These power centers think and act in the logic of “DIME” power application: They look at Diplomacy, Information/Ideology, Military, and the Economy in terms of power; considering how they and their counterparts could utilize related tools, as well as how to shape the will to deploy them. European institutions, post-1991, have largely traded this strategic thinking for the WTO and believing in “one open world forever”, focusing on "world goals" instead of their own development, wealth, power, and security. Now America tries to bring Europe back to the way powers think: Help yourself and your own sphere ("civilization"). Instead of acting in the name of lofty "global ideals" while severely falling behind - and getting played by China and its political influence, market domination, and economic leverage operations.
And all this is happening in time – before China can both replace the last key segments of Western industry and displace the U.S. Navy as the world's dominant maritime force. After all, Beijing is running the fastest armament program since World War II, with a strong naval focus. But building a true blue water navy takes decades. Which is why the coming years offer the final window in which Washington can still exploit its maritime lead as a decisive lever.
Understanding Communication Tactics:
Trump Purposefully Creates Uncertainty and Confusion Among Traditional Observers
Most of daily news is driven by a constant back and forward, confusing observers. This is particularly true with regard to U.S. politics – and Trump, a U.S. President who, since the 1980s, has mastered the art of playing with the public sphere: mobilizing supporters, amplifying his message through others, directing attention, provoking reactions, and shaping the environment to motivate or flatter, praise or disparage, distract or confuse, warn or, at times, intimidate those with whom he must engage:
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To a seasoned New York real estate mogul turned savvy, unorthodox political leader like Trump, external communication is part guerrilla marketing, part distraction, part negotiation. And negotiation is a dance – not every move is obvious, back-and-forth is part of the game, and some intentions remain hidden. The objective is not necessarily to act randomly, but to remain difficult enough to assess that the other side cannot confidently conclude that restraint, delay, or defiance will carry no material cost. A counterpart convinced that every threat is a bluff can remain immovable; a counterpart unable to rule out action must price the possibility of escalation into its decisions.
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Trump deliberately creates unpredictability – and has even discussed this tactic in prior publications (Trump in the chapter „Foreign Policy: Fighting for Peace“ in his 2015 MAGA book: “I like being unpredictable. It keeps them off balance.”). The related necessity arises from the behavior of state leaders who otherwise bet on American Presidents being not ready to back their demands. Effective pressure therefore often requires preserving uncertainty about red lines, escalation thresholds, and the next move – enough uncertainty that the other side cannot safely dismiss a warning, remain entrenched, or simply wait him out.
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In that same sense of communication as a tactical tool, Trump mastered the art of drawing the attention on him, while strategically placing in power those whom he trusts being capable of and reliable in elaborating and executing his visions. And so while his triggered fans cheer and his triggered opponents scream, Trump's strategists, generals, lawyers, economists, and bankers build below the radar.
True, Trump like any President has to balance objectives and interests that may pull in opposite directions – for example, wrt Hormuz: Containing energy-price pressures (upcoming U.S. elections) while pursuing the longer-term goal of limiting China's access to cheap oil. Compared with his first term, however, Trump now appears markedly more confident and determined to pursue the course that he and his advisers consider strategically necessary, no matter what.
The Bottom Line:
What We See Unfolding Today Largely Reflects the Main Scenario
We Had Published in the Early 2020s
A useful framework for understanding current events is our “Big Reshuffle” scenario, which we identified as the most likely trajectory in the early 2020s and now see increasingly reflected in developments on the ground. It can be summarized as follows:
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During the 2020s, the United States reorganizes its sphere – near, meaning the Americas, and distant, meaning Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific – to prevail in the strategic competition with its only global challenger: China. Washington returns to a modern form of Cold War realism, leaves behind much of the “global values” foreign policy pursued since the 1990s, and reconstructs the Western bloc around industrial resilience, energy dominance, maritime leverage, financial centrality, and alliance discipline.
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To implement this grand strategic adaptation, Washington combines naval power – a modern “Rule of the Waves” – with the pursuit of energy dominance and tighter control over industrial and technological supply chains. Trade remains vital, but is reorganized along strategic spheres, bottlenecks, and controlled or contested pathways. Tariff threats and negotiated tariff deals, export controls, and dollar diplomacy are used to obtain “China de-risking” concessions from allies and third countries, gradually restricting China’s access to the most valuable Western markets and critical supply chains.
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At the maritime core of this architecture lies leverage over Hormuz, the Red Sea, Panama, the Greenland passages, and the Arctic route. Maritime control, cheap energy, logistics, critical raw materials, industrial capacity, and the defense of the dollar-centered financial system increasingly function as parts of a single strategic structure. “Pax Silica” is its industrial expression: a U.S.-centered coalition linking supply flows, advanced semiconductors, energy access, allied industrial bases, and chokepoint leverage in response to China’s strong position in rare earths and other strategic inputs – thereby influencing who can participate in the next industrial revolution, and on what terms.
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For Europe, the first phase of this adjustment is disorienting. Many political and institutional actors continue to cling to the assumptions and values of the post-Cold War period, because structural change is difficult and established systems defend themselves. Yet Washington’s “friendly pressure” is pushing Europe to assume greater responsibility for NATO, defense, and internal security, while refocusing on its Western political and cultural foundations, industrial renewal, economic growth, and wealth creation – rather than ever-expanding regulation and a moralism-driven emphasis on purportedly universal “world values” that often reflect particular political interests. In this scenario, American pressure is therefore not simply abandonment. It is “America's new tough love” intended to force adaptation and, in doing so, enable Europe to preserve its own future. Without that external pressure, Europe risks becoming a “declining master of morality”: geopolitically weak, industrially irrelevant, economically stagnant, and increasingly reduced to a shrinking old market and controlled theme park for a Eurasian hegemon China on which it depends. Thus: The alternative America suggests is a Europe capable of generating power, industry, growth, security, stability, and prosperity for free citizens and businesses under democratic rule of law – rather than substituting NGO-driven moralism, regulatory accumulation, and value lectures for material capacity.
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By 2023, our models already considered Donald Trump’s return to office as being "highly likely", and we published that assessment while much of Europe’s media environment still treated a Biden or Harris victory as nearly certain. Trump, however, is not the cause of this grand strategic adaptation, but its natural accelerator. Like other American “Strategic Disruptor Presidents,” as we call them, he breaks established pillars and redirects America’s course toward the requirements of a new era. Since its founding 250 years ago, the United States has periodically elevated such Strategic Disruptor Presidents. Each transition is loud and disorderly, but eventually produces a new normal rather than a restoration of the old one. This reflects a recurring pattern of pragmatic adaptation and renewal rooted in America’s unsentimental, entrepreneurial, and forward-looking political and economic culture. America broke from the British Empire in the 1770s; recast the early-republic political order in the 1820s; settled the supremacy of the Union over secessionist state sovereignty in the 1860s; established federal economic regulation and abandoned strategic passivity around 1900; broke with laissez-faire orthodoxy and constructed a new international order in the 1940s; dismantled a central pillar of the financial system it had built in the 1970s; and is now adapting once again – as messily, but also as structurally, as before. For more on these cycles and the role of Strategic Disruptor Presidents, see here. (For more on these cycles and the Strategic Disruptor Presidents see here.)
The strategic implication remains clear: control over low-cost energy, access to American and allied markets, the dollar-based financial system, and critical resource flows gives Washington substantial influence over the development paths of allies, neutral states, and adversaries. At the same time, the United States is seeking to secure its leading position in the AI-driven transformation of industrial, capital, informational, and military power. And in doing so eventually win this Cold War 2.0.
The direction of this scenario, and the structural forces driving it, can be described in greater detail as follows.
Executive Summaries of Our White Books Anticipating Today’s Global Reshuffle
----------------
Grounded in Realism and a Keen Eye On the Sources of America's Extraordinary Power and Its Deeper Grand Strategy
About the Author, Olivier Scherlofsky, and his consulting value:
'Olivier possesses both kinds of intelligence that I consider critical to success; I call them “book smarts” and “street smarts”. He is not only extremely bright (in an academic sense), but he is savvy, observant, strategic and insightful. […] Olivier is remarkably well-schooled and experienced in economic sanctions, this highly technical and somewhat esoteric discipline. […]'
By Paul Hatch, Washington D.C. lawyer, lobbyist, and strategic advisor with one of the best track records in the history of political consulting in the U.S.
Our Main Scenario and How It Unfolds:
The Summaries of Our White Books
2023
2025
2026
Summary of the
White Book 2023
Knowledge Is Power - and Profits
In our 2023 white book The Big Reshuffle we provide an understanding for the why and how – of both (a) the changes and (b) the reason these fundamental shifts surprise most (being stuck in the post-Cold War paradigm).
In doing so, we have been able to predict ("most likely scenario direction ahead", see preview PDF below) among others, that, how, and why the United States will leave its post-Cold War views behind, returning to Realism and great power politics, with a long-term focus on countering the rise of China (while being forced to carefully manage a slow and deal-supported separation from China`s supply chains). A return of American great power politics executed with a focus on economic power (tariffs to achieve political goals, sanctions and export controls,...) as well as via the revitalization of U.S. naval dominance and its effective application (control of sea lanes, "gunboat diplomacy", blockades). In other words we provided an understanding for the following paradigm change: In the 1990s the U.S. changed the course of itself and the world, driven by an idealistic “colorful world” paradigm. In the 2020s this recent and unsustainable “one world” model is becoming history – not least due to America’s own frustration over the effects of what we call Idealism, and its moralism-driven attitudes.
Similarly, the white book predicted and predicts that and why Europe will (at first) feel overwhelmed and confused about such a new America and world stage, but then (eventually) fundamentally change and adapt to these new realities - while still remaining allied to the U.S. Since, (a) even a more self-reliant Europe is incapable to replace the American nuclear umbrella or the U.S. Navy – while being even more depend on global security and the world’s oceans (Europe economically survives based on large-scale overseas imports and exports). And since (b) on the other hand the U.S. will only be able to contain China, if the latter cannot split the West and pull Europe (in addition to Russia during the last years) into its orbit.
Understanding such geopolitical forces and the (often informal/implicit but powerful) grand strategies of key powers, we hereunder identify drivers that will reshuffle the world. Such as that the U.S. – under any of its Presidents – will most likely eventually work on preventing Russia becoming a de facto "colony" of a new Chinese empire. While also expecting Europe to (again, like during the last Cold War) be serious in matters of defense, as condition for a strong and lasting transatlantic alliance.
Note: Below synopsis of the book was added after the election of Trump 2 – one of the key events the book (published 2023) predicted, confirming its findings. Consequently, there was no need to revise the content: the deeper structural forces and trends in the U.S., Europe, and globally, as outlined in the book, still apply. Indeed, they are currently in the process of unfolding. For example: not only did our white book predict and explain the rise of certain European defense stocks, but even the shift towards 3.5% to 5% GDP defense spending in Europe. At the time of publishing considered “impossible” – for those many lacking the type of insights that our geopolitical intelligence approach produces.
Whereas one might agree with below scenario outlines as well as the described logics and effects of the new American and European directions, or not. But these estimates might at least help as "devil's advocate assessments". After all, staying ignorant to these probable developments ahead will likely hurt one side only – those who ignore the related trends and don't (like to) consider such scenarios.
Bottomline and Summary of Our 2023 White Book
"The Big Reshuffle"
History unfolds in cycles. We are at the beginning of a return to Realism, geopolitics, and the relevance of the nation state. From markets, to international relations, to culture. In this book, the author merges geopolitical intelligence analysis with business best practice – into a guide for navigating through the Age of the U.S.-China Rivalry. The rivalry that will reshuffle the world – and has become one of the key drivers dismantling globalization.
I. The Most Likely Scenario Ahead: The End of the Recent "Post-Cold War West" Is the Beginning of a New West
In the most likely scenario laid out in the book, a reoriented (Realism-driven) U.S. will first renew and readjust itself. Then, secondly (almost in parallel but lagging behind in the process), Europe will (have to) run through a phase of fundamental change and adaption. An adaption that on the long run will enable the survival of NATO (“NATO Adjusted”) and a renewed EU. Resulting in a united Europe that is grounded in strong allied nation states. Nation states again focused on security, industry, as well as freedom and wealth of its populations – not global moralizing.
Based on that Western internal and external reality realignment, like during the last Cold War, this U.S.-led Free World will become prosperous, secure, attractive, and influential again. And eventually succeed in a new type of Cold War – this time after a very long struggle vs. China. A struggle particularly fought with strategic sanctions, tariffs and other anti-import measures, export controls, subsidies, investments, and industry & monetary policies. Backed by navies if necessary. And while international trade will remain vital, it will only be mastered by those prepared and positioned well. Billions will be poured into strategic sectors. And, like during the last Cold War, probably the next economic Kondratiev wave will be triggered. An outlook of an eventually successful U.S.-led (renewed) West that makes it highly advisable to be on America’s side. Recommending businesses, but also key powers like India and Russia, to consider well where they want to stay during the years and decades ahead.
II. Grasping the Deeper Structural Forces Behind America's Geopolitical Shift
Trump 1 was not an "odd outlier". Rather, his first term represents the harbinger of a new age. Trump 2 will continue and consolidate what started under his first term. And this new reality will be lasting and bipartisan: Any U.S. President of the 2020s and 2030s will (have to) continue pursuing the underlying grand strategic U.S. goal of “preventing China from becoming Eurasia’s hegemon”.
III. Understanding the Logic and Character of Trump's American Realism
The foreign policy logic of Trump, his administration, and the renewed Republican Party is rooted in (a) great-power-driven Realism (not Isolationism!) focused on what’s best for America, but also (b) a commitment to, within the Western sphere itself, defend the Western values – from democracy, the rule of law, free speech, and freedom of religion to market capitalism, patriotism, family, and the willingness to uphold all of this with a strong and credible defense. While at the same time (c) accepting and respecting other nations and civilizations, as well as their perspectives in a complex and non-uniform world. Initiating a shift in the center of the West that will also bring an end to the post-Cold War paradigm, where the West was moralizing while non-Western powers abused the West's Idealism ("Let’s cheer on those Western forces who feel responsible for everything, want the West to pay for everything, or push for its own de-industrialization. While we do the opposite.").
Culturally, the origins of this Trump/MAGA foreign policy logic lie not only in the early United States (from the Founders to Presidents like Andrew Jackson and William McKinley). But also (a) in the values of traditional American Anticommunism as well as (b) the related foreign policy school of Realism; both thriving between the 1950s and 1980s. At that time resulting in a paradigm that, among others, sustained the transatlantic bond during the first Cold War, enabling both NATO and European unity.
IV. A Europe (Forced by Reality) to Learn, Understand, and Adapt
Thus, this new American foreign policy still considers and values its European allies – but expects them to move in a similar, Realism- instead of Idealism-driven, direction; not least regarding defense burden-sharing.
And since Europe has no other chance to survive geopolitically than to stay close to the U.S. and thus learn and adapt, in our most likely scenario Europe will eventually learn and adapt – to the new world realities and a new America.
V. Bottom Line for Businesses
From a business angle, we expect risks and opportunities unheard of in decades. After all, as a business being smart and daring during dynamic times is historically the right thing to do; while being too passive or sticking with obsolete world views becomes dangerous.
For FI and corporations, the following aspects are crucial:
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Analytical: Developing a minimum level of geopolitical intelligence (i.e., proper observation and interpretation).
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Operational: Ensuring commercial and legal-regulatory resilience (avoid compliance errors, especially serious ones, and at the same time steer clear of unnecessary, business-restricting “over-compliance due to ignorance”).
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Strategic: Having the ability to adapt accordingly in terms of positioning (investments, products/markets, etc.).
With respect to the specific consequences on the risk side, it is advisable to prepare for the following “weaponization of the economy” sub-trends in the coming years:
• Sanctions strategies and related export controls
• Tariffs and industry policies
• Use of currency power
• Other restrictions on trade and cross-border investment flows
• Increasingly extraterritorial investigations and actions by U.S. authorities
• A new “era of national security compliance”
• The reemergence of the age-old reality that it matters under which flag commercial ships sail
• Exceptionally high political risks outside the West (with decreasing rule-of-law reliability for property, operations, and personnel)
At the same time, it is important not to overlook major opportunities, which can be summarized as follows:
• Nations and blocs fostering trade and investment flows “among friends” (enabling trade pacts previously unlikely)
• Nations pouring billions into strategic sectors and supply-chain security
• Rivalry-driven positive developments at the micro level: Individual businesses having exceptional opportunities, such as (a) gaining market share from competitors who fail to understand and adapt; (b) receiving capital or contracts from Western governments now spending generously for strategic purposes; or (c) moving quickly to act on potential “swing events” in the near future.
Thus, we recommend to don't view this geopolitical reordering only as a risk but also as an opportunity. Companies that wisely align their strategies and processes can become more resilient than their struggling competitors; while unlocking new markets and possibilities. In dynamic times, the smarter and faster prevail, not (necessarily) the bigger. In light of the current upheaval, focus on both risk mitigation and opportunity seizure, based on a new paradigm understood!
The complete white book The Big Reshuffle can be ordered at Amazon and other book stores.
Summary of the
White Book 2025
The 2025 Update
The Big Reshuffle Unfolding
Or: Why and How Europe Will Follow the New American Direction – and Eventually Thank America for Renewing the West
The follow-up publication to The Big Reshuffle (2023), which had predicted Trump’s return and the global scenario currently unfolding. Written as an essay-type report, deliberately challenging the anti-Trump narratives distributed across the EU.
Bottomline and Summary of Our 2025 White Book
"The Big Reshuffle UNFOLDING"
In The Big Reshuffle (2023) we predicted (“most likely” scenario), that in order to renew itself and counter China, the U.S. would grand strategically readjust (first) itself and (then) its bloc (Europe,...). And re-elect the “Strategic Disruptor” Donald Trump. Who – this time with a deep and broad administrative base – would then lead this cyclical adaptation. Now, August 2025, even CNN (its "data guru" Harry Enten) airs that “the Trump administration is arguably the most influential this century; and probably dating back a good portion of the last century as well. Love it, like it, lump it. Trump is remaking in the United States of America.” As well as the world.
However, while in much of the world the reelection of Trump is viewed (very) positively, Europe remains the only large region where Trump is still painted as erratic, irrational, or worse.
Relatedly, many Europeans opposing the current American direction remain hopelessly hopeful for a return to a “pre-Trump America”. Naively not understanding that neither Republicans nor Democrats would rebuild post-Cold War pillars – from WTO dominance and open-border approaches to “value interventions” or “forever/nation-building wars”. Instead, U.S. foreign policy will likely follow a renewed, Realism-based grand strategy focused on the long game against China – a China increasingly flexing its muscles and poised to dominate Asia and Europe through supply-chain dependencies and, next, control of key sea lines, unless a U.S. course change intervenes.
From a European perspective the irony being that actually Trump’s “pushy readjustment” of the West is saving Europe (incl. NATO and EU) – from the brutal decline those increasingly face who stick to post-Cold War Idealisms while under geopolitical and domestic challenges not seen since WW II.
This is not to blame Europeans. Most people in the world form views on U.S. politics from media narratives rather than experience. In that sense hereunder offers a reflection tool for Europeans – helping to explain why (since 10 years) most in the EU are constantly surprised about Trump, his victories, and his geopolitical moves.
The Book`s Structure and Key Takeaways:
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In Europe, Blunt Anti-Trump Media Coverage Merged with Nostalgic Post-Cold War Idealism Creates a Systemic Blindness for the Strategic Reshuffle Unfolding -
The U.S. Has a Cycle of Self-Chosen Strategic Change and Renewal – Due to Its Geopolitical Substance, Unique Political Setup, Flexible Elites, and Can-Do Culture -
The Outlines of a New American Grand Strategy Can Be Identified: Prepare America for a Different Age and Counter China -
The Executors of America’s Strategic Transition Phase: The American Tycoon Trump and His New Team of Loyal Winners -
Trump’s Election and Reelection Have Been Clear – and Telling – American Choices -
A Suggestion Regarding Where to Place Trump Historically and Grand Strategically: Nixon, Reagan, Trump -
Why and How America’s Old Allies in the World Will First Complain – but Eventually Follow the New American Direction -
In the U.S. and Europe, from the Right to the Left, Conservative Values Push Back Against Recent Progressiveness and Its Belief in Ever-More Globalization -
Conclusion and Most Likely Scenario Direction Ahead: The Predicted Big Reshuffle Has Started to Unfold
The complete white book The Big Reshuffle UNFOLDING can be ordered at Amazon and other book stores.
Summary of the
White Book 2026
This latest scenario book is reserved for our corporate clients; and will not be available to the public until its 2027 delayed market release.
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However, a comprehensive summary is provided below.
The 2026 Update
The Big Reshuffle and Its First Effects
America has begun reestablishing an architecture of primacy:
hard power, logistics, and a reconfigured grand strategy.
Our clients understand world events in the broader context, forward looking: In Scherlofsky's 2023 white book and the 2025 update, the shift in American grand strategy currently unfolding was predicted as the "most likely scenario". By 2026, the first effects of this Big Reshuffle are visible. The world's (dis)order is getting adjusted – and we can map it.
Whereas, what we recommended then to the elites of Europe and the non-Western world alike was unambiguous:
"An outlook of an eventually successful U.S.-led (renewed) West that makes it highly advisable to be on America’s side. Recommending businesses, but also key powers like India and Russia, to consider well where they want to stay during the years and decades ahead."
That recommendation has not aged. It has hardened. Whereas this recommendation to align with America's renewed path is true for other nations too, be it for example Serbia or Austria.
Bottomline and Summary of Our 2026 White Book
"The Big Reshuffle and Its First Effects"
While daily dynamics and news distract most observers, America is changing the world. By centering a new grand strategy around America's "Rule of the Waves", Washington is gaining dominance over the flows of affordable energy and logistics, while also defending the centrality of the American financial system. At the same time, Washington is building a new coalition (Pax Silica), to tie critical supply flows and America's allies into a "product-driven foreign policy" and related supply-chain architecture for the AI-driven industrial age.
Thus, we urge Europeans to look beyond the flawed idea distributed across the EU that the U.S. would be losing in Iran or not know what it is doing, since the opposite can be recognized. Not only by those who invest in the U.S. (The U.S. equity market, driven by estimates about future well-being, is at record highs. With the "war month" April 2026 showing growth rates rare in stock market history.)
Currently, many are confused about America’s strategy behind its Iran policy, and others have still not read Venezuela, Panama, or Greenland right. But at the same time these observers are disoriented, Washington has moved further: visiting Morocco and Indonesia to deepen military cooperation directly in front of two of the world’s most critical straits.
Now, the major maritime chokepoints in the world – Gibraltar, Malacca, Hormuz, the Red Sea, Panama, and the Greenland passages (incl. its Arctic lane) – are effectively being drawn under American power. Other, less known, chokepoints add to the list. According to our model and its so far confirmed “most likely scenario direction”, all this is a central pillar of America’s renewed grand strategy. One based on an American uniqueness most Europeans forgot about: that the worldwide flow of imports and exports, and the related fate of trade-dependent nations, is based on an enforcing, globally dominant naval power – a force only the U.S. possesses. Unless China can – for many more years – continue building its worldwide infrastructure network and global navy; which it started doing at an armament pace not seen since World War II.
However, the strategic reason for this major U.S.-led adjustment of the world system – a system the U.S. itself designed and enabled from 1945 onward – goes deeper than naval competition. From the threat perspective of the most influential American strategists, an unchecked Beijing would eventually turn East Asia, Russia, Europe, and Africa into captive markets and dependent political masses for a new, globally dominant Chinese superpower. Europe, in that scenario, would become a deindustrialized and declining former Western pillar, unable to compete with the forces of the future.
China, then, would hold most of the world's cards in manufacturing, critical raw materials, AI-enabled information control, international logistics, and political influence (influence bought through the immense investment cash a centralized economic superpower provides). Risking such a “Communist Chinese Eurasia” is therefore unacceptable from the perspective of America’s vital national interests, even before considering related effects such as the collapse of the American-led global financial system or a China that vastly outperforms U.S. defense capabilities and global power projection.
And in that very sense, the above mentioned maritime chokepoints are put under the American umbrella. In addition, the targeting system of U.S. sanctions, matched with the renewed naval presence, now lets U.S. Navy boarding parties pick vessels anywhere in the open oceans – be it in the Indian Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico/America. A maritime chokepoint, in effect, is wherever the U.S. Navy is ordered to be. All while Beijing's debt-heavy Belt and Road strategy cannot replace maritime lanes, since to operate economically sound most import and export goods have to be shipped on sea.
Relatedly, the U.S. has flipped from being dependent on the energy of others to becoming the world's most dominant energy broker and supplier. All while OPEC gets weaker and weaker in its coherence and power to steer supply and prices...
With this triad of dominance – energy, naval, and related supply-chain-coalition – the U.S. ensures that, as the world transitions into the AI-driven industrial future, where nothing goes without affordable (ideally cheap) energy, cheap (enough) critical raw materials, and tons of IT hardware, America will not only remain the most advanced power and economy. But will also be able to decide who rises with it – and who stays in the basket of developing nations. Or worse: Falls back into a basket of declining, deindustrializing, once-developed countries.
Thereby, this adapted American grand strategy, one rooted in core principles of geopolitical power, does not bet on “controlling all flows.” Global control was the idea behind the strategic program launched in the 1990s, which was centered on the promotion of idealistic “values to change the whole world.” In the end, it failed: unlike during the Cold War prior to this program, the West did not become stronger and more attractive; instead, after success in the 1990s, from the 2000s on non-Western powers and authoritarian models rose despite the defeat of the USSR (a victory that, it seems, was not used well). But global control is neither possible nor necessary. What is necessary – and what the U.S. is achieving in these months and years – is to become the only force in the world that can guarantee secure and affordable global flows for itself and its allies (those being loyal), while retaining the ability to disrupt or deny the flows on which adversaries depend.
What makes this hard to read from Brussels is that strategists in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow think in the logic of “DIME” power application: They look at Diplomacy, Information/Ideology, Military, and the Economy in terms of power; considering how they and their counterparts could utilize related tools, as well as how to shape the will to deploy them. European institutions, post-1991, have largely traded this strategic thinking for the WTO and believing in “one open world forever”, focusing on "world goals" instead of their own development, wealth, power, and security. Now America tries to bring Europe back to the way powers think: Help yourself and your allies, instead of acting in the name of lofty "ideals" while falling back behind China & Co.
Trump’s tactically deployed theater compounds this lack of a realism-based perception in today's Europe. Trump often applies a Shake-and-Shape toolkit: provocations to flood and distract in the news zone, outlandish opening positions designed to settle high, or ugly statements to push and trigger actors. (Most important example for the latter: Ugly statements to unlock the necessary European rearmament by allies who could otherwise not justify such costs domestically, since prior to Trump the mantra "the Americans will always help us" stalled all real effort.) This is Trump’s maneuver toolkit and related noise. But what actually shapes the big picture is this: Trump is what we call a "Strategic Disruptor President" (a type of leader occurring every few decades in the U.S.) who deliberately breaks with some pillars of the old order, domestically and geopolitically. And in doing so allows "America’s Strategist Class" to draft and execute a policy pivot needed to adjust America’s grand strategy. For that reason, in our 2023 white book, we recommended watching America’s strategic masterminds. And back then presented for example Elbridge Colby, a Harvard and Yale educated National Security expert and pentagon veteran, as the strategist number one to get familiar with. To most Europeans, Colby was “merely one among thousands" in the U.S. private sector focused on geopolitical thought. For us, however, he was a key player whose deeply grand strategic concepts would become ever more real. And real they become: Now, by 2026, Colby sits at the U.S. Department of War, as Under Secretary of War for Policy. And if one follows Department of War and White House announcements about worldwide defense visits, one can see that Colby is actually very active. However, he is merely one among many American master strategists who insert much more strategic logic into U.S. actions than daily news suggest.
The “2029 Waiting Game” being played by parts of European leadership is therefore a dangerous bet. It rests on hope. Hopeless hope, since the American Strategist Class will still be in the room in 2030 and beyond while the world has changed forever, no matter the name or party of the then U.S. President.
But let’s dive into each of these critical components, as well as the bigger historical picture linking them...
The Big Reshuffle Currently Unfolding Will Outlast Trump’s Presidency
A common European reading of the first phase of Trump's second term is that the United States has been seized by an erratic personality, that the global order is being broken on Trump’s whim, and that 2029 will bring restoration. This is an idealistic hope that will most likely hurt those holding it. An illusion made worse by an inability to grasp the bigger picture, due to daily distractions – from Trump’s tactical “back-and-forth” during dynamic phases, a skill he has developed since the 1980s, to the amusing idea of a “game changer in Hungary” (the young right-wing leader replacing the old one, Orbán, is not a “game changer against Trump"; Magyar and his MAGA-style policies will become a more reliable partner to the U.S. than many other EU nations are – you may bet on it).
However, the Big Reshuffle is not a Trump phenomenon. We mapped it as our most likely scenario already in 2023, before the 2024 election, because the same structural forces would push any U.S. administration in the same direction. Trump “merely” leads a reshuffle that follows a geopolitical logic – one that is partly externally driven and partly internally driven.
To better understand this “shift permanence,” it helps to understand Trump through an American historical pattern: Trump is what we call a Strategic Disruptor President – a form of U.S. leader who is voted into power every few decades. One who breaks with the at-the-time “unchangeable rules,” does the “impossible,” and is labeled “immoral” by the political opposition – or worse. This is a real pattern, owed both to America’s geopolitical parameters and to its forward-looking, pragmatic culture:
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1770s/80s: America was born through strategic disruption. George Washington broke from the British Empire, doing what observers deemed “impossible” and “outrageous.”
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1820s/30s: Andrew Jackson shattered the early-republic political system and the grip of its elites at the time.
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1860s: Abraham Lincoln smashed an unsustainable party system and forged a true nation-state while winning the most disruptive war on the American continent in history.
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Last 1800s/first 1900s: The tandem Disruptor Strategic Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt ended the domestic principal of “almost no federal regulation” and broke with the foreign-policy pillar of “non-imperialism”: Deploying force, foreign investment projects, and diplomacy, to replace the Spanish Empire in the Western Hemisphere.
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1930s/40s: FDR abandoned the laissez-faire market orthodoxy that so far had defined American capitalism, through the New Deal; and later built a new world order centered on Bretton Woods and the United Nations.
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1970s/80s: The Nixon/Reagan tandem, interrupted by a tame-and-lame Ford/Carter interlude, shattered the previous financial order and won the Cold War by breaking rules and thinking outside the box. First, Nixon ended the gold standard, turned China from an adversary into a partner against the threat of the time, the USSR, and created the geopolitical-financial petrodollar system. Then Reagan backed a brutal interest-rate hike, radically changed exchange rates through the Plaza Accord to reorder global trade balances, and, through comprehensive pressure, pushed the USSR to the point of implosion. Both Presidents laid the groundwork for globalization. A globalization that, back then, helped the West win the Cold War and thrive – until Western deindustrialization went too far (not just cheap-labor outsourcing but losing high-tech and critical supply) while China became ever stronger.
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2010s/2020s: We have arrived at the next culmination point of the American Disruptive Cycle under President Trump. He was repeatedly elected not despite, but because he personifies unapologetic, disruptive change of course.
Once these Strategic Disruptor Presidents have finished, their successors do not try to “rebuild” the prior state. Rather – in a very American display of the above-mentioned pragmatism, mixed with a lack of feasible alternatives – they move on without looking back, no matter which political faction they come from. Just like that.
The American Strategist Class that Operates Below the News Noise
This deep logic-driven trend was predictable to those reading the right players among the “American Strategist Class” rather than daily news or politically-driven papers.
We mentioned already Elbridge Colby as a central figure. Another of these masterminds within the American Strategist Class whom we recommended watching and listening to is Marco Rubio. During his confirmation hearing in early 2025, he publicly put into words what can be seen as the underlying premise that breaks with the canon and gospel of the last 30 years, and partly the last 80:
“The post-war global order is not just obsolete; it is now a weapon being used against us. […] If we don’t change course, we are going to live in a world where much of what matters to us on a daily basis, from our security to our health, will be dependent on whether the Chinese allow us to have it or not.”
Rubio's State Department has since moved from rhetoric to architecture. Inside that architecture, a notable high tech world actor has stepped out from the bench of the Strategist Class onto the operational field: Jacob Helberg, confirmed in September 2025 as Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment. A Silicon-Valley veteran (Google, then Palantir, where he served as senior adviser to CEO Alex Karp), a former commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, founder of the Hill & Valley Forum, and author of "The Wires of War: Technology and the Global Struggle for Power" (2021). His book, published years before he took office, already mapped the problem he now confronts in policy: techno-totalitarian regimes, China above all, are seeking back-end control of the global technology stack, from chips to standards to platforms. The Wires-of-War thesis has now become another State Department doctrine.
Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, War Secretary Pete Hegseth, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, DFC CEO Ben Black, and others in the cabinet share the same playbook and drive their organisations accordingly.
The bottom line to grasp, from a European perspective: Even a Democratic successor in 2029 would not unwind this. Should a Democrat win in 2028, he or she would use gentler language and publicly complain about “the damage done”; but silently be thankful that “it was Trump who did the dirty work shaking the world system so America, the West, and capitalism, not China and its authoritarian control system, stays at the top”.
America Is in a Long Game Trying to Prevent China from Becoming Eurasia’s Hegemon
The single paramount goal driving every layer of the reshuffle is to prevent China, the structurally determined “Red Player,” from dominating the Eurasian landmass, which American strategic thought has long identified as the geopolitical scenario to avoid at all costs. From this premise, four operational lines follow:
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reintegrate the periphery of the American Core Island, from Greenland to Central America;
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shock the European allies, part of the “Blue Players,” into relearning the cold logic of power, so they are survivable in the new world and become again reliable, relevant allies (as they where during last Cold War);
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pull the critical “Green Players” – Russia, Iran, India, and Brazil – away from China, or degrade their value to Beijing; and
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position American naval superiority where it can leverage against China’s structural dependence on sea lanes.
We described all four lines in 2023. By 2026, all four are visibly in motion. Any conciliatory phase or deal between the U.S. and China is for both sides meant to win time: Both China and the U.S. are currently still in the phase of mutual dependence in some key areas. To apply a tough but telling analogy: They talk to each other like two rival clans that have captured family members of the other side. Once the phase of "exchange" (or the hope for it) has ended, the gloves will be off. And this will be reality sooner than later. After all, not least the U.S. has, as part of hereunder described strategy, switched gear to secure critical raw material supply currently dominated by China. Such as via the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC, see below).
From this structural pivot flow concrete operational moves. Washington is not retreating into isolationism. It is re-centering. Instead of being passive and watching China getting ever more powerful over ever more dependent other Eurasian nations, America regains initiative as the organizing power of a reconfigured world.
Access to Affordable Energy Is No Longer a Cost Factor – It Is Again the Substrate of Power, Wealth, and Development, as During the Last Cold War
At the core of the transformation sits an “Energy Dominance” doctrine, now operational. Well affordable and abundant energy is becoming the decisive foundation for the compute-intensive AI sectors that will define the next hegemonic cycle. And the U.S. is turning itself into the world's central exporter and broker of oil, gas, and LNG, building a buffer against global volatility while turning supply leverage into a coercive instrument. Just a few weeks after the Iran war, The Wall Street Journal put it directly: “The Iran War Is Making the American Economy More Dominant Than Ever.” They are right: Insulated by domestic production, Washington can constrain rival suppliers without crippling itself. Macro-analysts like Jim Bianco in mid-April 2026 rightfully noted that supertankers are abandoning the volatile Persian Gulf to secure a share of America’s roughly 5 million barrels per day in exports. A standard 21-day Middle East-to-Asia voyage is being replaced by a 50-plus-day haul from U.S. The power and profits that follow are indisputable.
Venezuela closes the hemispheric circle. Through 2025, Washington stacked maximum-pressure sanctions, a December naval blockade of the Venezuelan shadow fleet, and Operation Southern Spear into a campaign whose strategic purpose was always more than counter-narcotics. On January 3, 2026, U.S. forces captured Nicolás Maduro in Caracas in Operation Absolute Resolve. By January 20, the first USD 300 million from a 50-million-barrel oil supply deal had landed. By February, U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright was in Caracas to redirect its oil policies. The America First Policy Institute’s October 2025 Venezuela Roundtable captured the doctrine in one phrase: Venezuela should become “the Energy Hub of the Americas.” Project 2025’s call to “re-hemisphere” supply chains and Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy directive to “reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine” are no longer text on a page – they are barrels under contract. Texas LNG controls the Atlantic. Caribbean crude underwrites the AI substrate. Strategic rivals attempting to lock in long-term oil supply now negotiate, in effect, with Washington.
Maritime Command Is Now an Architecture, Not a Mere List of Chokepoints
Parallel to energy dominance, Washington has moved decisively to dominate the physical chokepoints of global shipping – then expanded the logic well beyond them.
The Western Hemisphere is locked from the Arctic to Cape Horn. From August 2025, Operation Southern Spear and the deployment of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group turned the Caribbean into a U.S. forward operating zone; by early 2026, the corridor was sealed against Venezuelan shadow tankers and the Maduro regime had fallen. At the same time, Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison was forced out of the Panama Canal port concessions; in January 2026, Panama’s Supreme Court ruled the Chinese contracts unconstitutional. The Arctic axis is being prepared next. Trump’s pressure on Denmark over Greenland was a calculated and successful move, paired with a related heavy Maritime Action Plan: To prevent China, which launched its first Arctic shipping route to Europe in September 2025, from building a foothold around Greenland before the Northwest Passage and Transpolar Sea Route become commercial. The maritime perimeter of the two Americas is now an American interior sea.
The Red Sea too, is part of the recognizable playbook. While first operations took place under Biden, Trump's 2025 air and naval campaign that ran until the May 2025 ceasefire with the Houthis set the stage for future operations. And it trained the NATO-plus allies into supporting such efforts: It drew the UK, Bahrain, and a coalition of NATO and Indo-Pacific partners into sustained U.S.-led maritime operations close to the Suez approaches. The EU’s parallel operation keeps a complementary track open.
And with the Iran-War in 2026 Hormuz is being structurally reshuffled for years to come. Iran’s warships have been sunk (“shaping” the environment), IRGC Navy chief Alireza Tangsiri, who had directed the closure of the Strait, was killed. The U.S. Navy, having spent weeks operating in close-quarters denial, now sits as the structural arbiter of the Strait. Civilian shipping through Hormuz flows when – and only when – Washington consents.
Then the U.S. visited Morocco and Indonesia to agree on increased military cooperation as mentioned before. Preparing the U.S. for a control of Gibraltar and Malacca, as deemed necessary.
Beyond the chokepoints, Washington now picks vessels anywhere. On April 21, 2026, U.S. forces boarded and seized the M/T Majestic X – a sanctioned VLCC capable of carrying two million barrels – in the open Indian Ocean; at about the same time the Tifani had been detained in the Bay of Bengal. Both interdictions rested on U.S. unilateral sanctions, enforced extraterritorially. The legal architecture is not new. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act of 2010, the NDAA 2012’s secondary-sanctions provisions, and the long build-out of OFAC’s shadow-fleet designations have constructed, over fifteen years, a regime in which non-U.S. persons in non-U.S. waters trading non-U.S. goods can be hauled in by U.S. forces if a dollar, a port call, or a sanctioned counterparty appears anywhere in the chain. What is new is the operational confidence to enforce the regime physically. Since Trump resumed office, more vessels have been sanctioned for moving Iranian petroleum; tankers are now intercepted in oceans far from the Gulf. The chokepoint, in effect, is wherever a U.S. boarding party arrives.
Pressure on Allies Is a Strategic Necessity, as Without It They Would Not Be Able to Adjust
The architecture is not maintained for free. Tensions with traditional partners are not erratic glitches in this framework; they are a calculated necessity. Under a “Peace through Strength” logic, coercive alignment is the instrument by which adaptation is accelerated and the burden is shifted onto allies who long benefited from American underwriting.
The political dimension of the Hormuz episode was a masterclass of its own. Certain geopolitical strategists argued even that Trump did not delay the reopening of the Strait by accident – and indeed the delay as necessary tactic would fit into the picture: For decades, Western nations had built their economies on the silent assumption that U.S. carriers would unconditionally secure their vital energy flows, which allowed them to underfund NATO while preaching multilateralism. When Trump pulled the security blanket on March 15 and told reliant nations to “take care of that passage” themselves, the initial European response was institutional inertia. EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas dismissed it: “This is not Europe’s war.” The UK and Japan rejected the call.
Then the economic pain arrived. Tanker traffic dropped 70%. One hundred fifty ships were stranded. Oil surged past USD 100 a barrel. The European posture collapsed overnight. By April 2, more than 40 nations had launched a coalition to secure the Strait, visibly led by British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper chairing the talks. By strategically withholding its forces, Washington forced the contradiction to the surface and reset the terms. A classical Trump move. Access to secure oil flows is now explicitly conditional on real financial and military contributions. War Secretary Hegseth codified this transactional reality on April 22: “exemplary allies” who engage – Israel, South Korea, Poland, Germany, and the Baltics – will receive special U.S. favor, while those failing to contribute to collective defense “will have to face consequences.” The new compact is now in writing.
Business Diplomacy Focused on Strategic Access Is Replacing the NGO Playbook
The framework that delivered American foreign policy through grants, NGOs, and values rhetoric is being dismantled. By March 10, 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio had already announced the cancellation of 83% of USAID programs – roughly 5,200 contracts. On March 28, he notified Congress that the agency would be dissolved and absorbed into the State Department. On July 1, 2025, USAID formally ceased to exist. The era of the NGO consortium acting as the deniable arm of American foreign policy is over.
What has replaced it is the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, now reauthorized through December 2031 under the bipartisan DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act of 2025, with a current investment cap of USD 205 billion. Its newly created Chief Strategic Officer position aligns every dollar with foreign-policy and national-security goals; the agency was directed to produce a five-year Strategic Priorities Plan oriented toward critical minerals, supply chains, energy, technology, infrastructure, and explicit competition with China. It too confirms the structural shift we recommended our clients prepare for: moving “soft power vehicles” from aid to investment, focusing capital where China has built leverage, and treating development finance as economic statecraft. DFC CEO Ben Black named the new posture without euphemism: “American Economic Statecraft is Back.”
The strategic logic is sharp and operational. DFC capital flows where China has gained ground and where the Western Hemisphere needs to be reanchored. USD 30 million in equity backs a Brazilian nickel-and-cobalt mining facility; a USD 553 million loan rebuilds 800 miles of railway and a mineral port serving the DRC and Angola, breaking China’s logistical grip on Central African mineral exports. The instrument is no longer a grant with conditions. It is an equity stake, an offtake agreement, a dollar credit line, or a port concession financed and steered. It comes with strategic alignment built in.
The pattern showed itself most starkly when the Iran conflict threatened the Gulf. The United Arab Emirates did not turn to international institutions. U.A.E. Central Bank Governor Khaled Mohamed Balama went directly to Washington. In meetings with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the U.A.E. sought a wartime financial lifeline in the form of a dollar currency-swap line. By serving as the ultimate guarantor of liquidity, Washington trades financial security for absolute geopolitical alignment. Regional balances of power are now managed through bilateral leverage, not through abstract normative commitments.
Pax Silica and the Product-Driven Foreign Policy: From Capital Statecraft to Coalition Statecraft
DFC was the first leg. Pax Silica is the second. Where DFC mobilizes American capital, Pax Silica mobilizes American allies for supply-chain purposes.
The coalition was inaugurated on December 12, 2025, at a Washington summit chaired by Under Secretary Helberg. Seven founding signatories – the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Israel, Australia, the U.K. – signed the Pax Silica Declaration. Within five months, the coalition had more than doubled. Qatar, the U.A.E., India, Sweden, Finland, the Philippines, Norway, and Greece followed in turn; with Greece linked via a parallel U.S.-Greece Economic Security Declaration. The Netherlands joined the inaugural summit as a non-signatory partner; being critical thanks to ASML. Canada, the OECD, and the European Union participate as observers; Taiwan participates as a non-signatory partner, with a related bilateral cooperation arrangement.
The selection logic is the doctrine. Japan and South Korea: semiconductor manufacturing. Australia: critical minerals. Israel and the U.K.: chip design. India: engineering talent. Singapore: Indo-Pacific connectivity. The U.A.E. and Qatar: capital and energy inputs. The Philippines: manufacturing-hub geography next to the South China Sea, paired with a young technically trained workforce. The Netherlands: lithography (ASML, the sole producer of EUV machines). Norway: sovereign-wealth capital and critical minerals. Sweden: 5G infrastructure (Ericsson) and mineral assets. Finland: telecom hardware (Nokia) and cybersecurity. Each member fills a layer of the stack America needs to dominate the AI-driven industrial future without depending on China.
Helberg has named the underlying foreign-policy philosophy openly. In an extended interview in May 2026 with American Optimist host Joe Lonsdale, he framed it as follows: "Part of what we're looking to do is actually partner with countries to have a product-driven approach to foreign policy. [...] The Chinese government has these state-owned enterprises in-house where they implement these big capital-intensive industrial projects. For us, it doesn't make sense for America to do that because that's not our strong suit. The government's not good at doing things in-house. What we're really good at is we have companies that make really great products. And so we want to lean into our unique strengths by having a product-based approach to foreign policy."
The U.S: State Department itself organizes the initiative around three 'lines of effort':
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Membership. Expanding the coalition along specific, complementary capabilities across the stack rather than along Cold-War-era diplomatic categories. Each new partner enters because it brings a layer the U.S. cannot easily replicate at home.
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Policy. Harmonized workstreams on export controls, investment screening, IP protection, sensitive-technology protection, and critical infrastructure — designed to create a secure, allied market environment for advanced compute and the materials feeding it.
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Projects. Flagship platforms rolled out across the member ecosystem, pairing American product capability with a host-country capability anchor. The Philippines is the first; further hubs are intended to follow, though concrete timelines and locations have not been officially announced.
One of its first flagships is the 4,000-acre Economic Security Zone in the Luzon Economic Corridor of the Philippines. Announced on April 16, 2026, it is the world's first AI-native industrial acceleration hub built under an allied coalition framework. It will process critical minerals, secure advanced manufacturing inputs, and feed the re-industrialized supply chains the U.S. is rebuilding across its domestic manufacturing centers.
The economic logic is brutal in its clarity. Pax Silica economies are growing much faster than most other nations. Which means Pax Silica nations and those close with them will transform into the new industrial age, while many others fall ever more back.
The contrast to Belt and Road is the rhetorical fulcrum. Where Beijing exports state-owned enterprises, Chinese labor, Chinese inputs, and Chinese debt – extracting more than it leaves behind – Pax Silica exports American products through partnership platforms designed to grow host-country capability.
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